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Abstract
Background: The recent publication of the WHO guideline on support to optimise community health worker
(CHW) programmes illustrates the renewed attention for the need to strengthen the performance of CHWs.
Performance partly depends on motivation, which in turn is influenced by incentives. This paper aims to critically
analyse the use of incentives and their link with improving CHW motivation.
Methods: We undertook a comparative analysis on the linkages between incentives and motivation based on
existing datasets of qualitative studies in six countries. These studies had used a conceptual framework on factors
influencing CHW performance, where motivational factors were defined as financial, material, non-material and
intrinsic and had undertaken semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with CHWs, supervisors,
health managers and selected community members.
Results: We found that (a mix of) incentives influence motivation in a similar and sometimes different way across
contexts. The mode of CHW engagement (employed vs. volunteering) influenced how various forms of incentives
affect each other as well as motivation. Motivation was negatively influenced by incentive-related “expectation
gaps”, including lower than expected financial incentives, later than expected payments, fewer than expected
material incentives and job enablers, and unequally distributed incentives across groups of CHWs. Furthermore,
we found that incentives could cause friction for the interface role of CHWs between communities and the
health sector.
Conclusions: Whether CHWs are employed or engaged as volunteers has implications for the way incentives influence
motivation. Intrinsic motivational factors are important to and experienced by both types of CHWs, yet for many salaried
CHWs, they do not compensate for the demotivation derived from the perceived low level of financial reward. Overall,
introducing and/or sustaining a form of financial incentive seems key towards strengthening CHW motivation. Adequate
expectation management regarding financial and material incentives is essential to prevent frustration about expectation
gaps or “broken promises”, which negatively affect motivation. Consistently receiving the type and amount of incentives
promised appears as important to sustain motivation as raising the absolute level of incentives.
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Background
Pursuit of ambitious global health initiatives, including
those related to the 2015 sustainable development goals,
led to renewed attention for health systems’ weaknesses
[1]. Key challenges include public sector human resource
shortages and their effects on access to services [2–6]. In
response, health systems have (again) turned to engaging
community health workers (CHWs) to reach out to
underserved communities. The evidence of the potential
contribution of CHWs to improving the health of popula-
tions is well documented [7–10], and there is renewed at-
tention for the potential of strengthening the performance
of CHWs; this is also evidenced by the recent publication
of the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline on
support to optimise CHW programmes [11].
Community health workers
CHWs, who often are from low socio-economic back-
grounds, have been defined as “any health worker carry-
ing out functions related to health care delivery; trained
in some way in the context of the intervention, and hav-
ing no formal professional or paraprofessional certificate
or degree in tertiary education” [8]. In addition, the
WHO has suggested CHWs should be supported by the
health system even when they are not a formal cadre
[12]. They are the first point of contact between health
service clients and providers, linking communities to the
health system [13, 14]. CHWs deliver a wide range of
promotive, preventive and partly curative services, in-
cluding maternal and child health, HIV care and treat-
ment of malaria [15, 16]. They are also in the unique
position of being able to bring insights about community
health to higher-level health workers [17]. CHWs mostly
work in public and non-governmental settings in low-
and middle-income countries (LMICs).
CHW motivation, performance and incentives
The ability of CHWs to deliver effective services de-
pends on many different contextual, health system and
intervention design factors [14, 16, 18, 19]. CHW re-
cruitment, retention and performance are enhanced by,
or may even depend on, CHW motivation [20], defined
as “an individual’s degree of willingness to exert and
maintain an effort towards organizational goals” [21].
Motivation in turn is influenced by incentives, which
can range from community appreciation to uniforms,
volunteer allowances and remuneration, among others
[7, 12, 17, 22, 23]. The diagram in Fig. 1 depicts this re-
lationship [20].
There has been much debate over the type, scope and
combination of incentives that would improve CHW
motivation. We define incentives as “the intrinsic and
extrinsic factors aimed at positively influencing CHW
motivation” [20, 24].
Extrinsic factors can take the form of financial, mater-
ial or non-material incentives. Financial incentives range
from fixed salaries for those formally employed and al-
lowances for volunteers, to performance-based incen-
tives. Material incentives may include health insurance,
clothing or tools of the trade such as boots and back-
packs. Non-material incentives include community rec-
ognition, preferential treatment and developing new
skills. Intrinsic factors relate for example to witnessing
positive change and personal growth [12, 24, 25]. Bicy-
cles and other forms of transport, regular supplies, train-
ing opportunities and supervision are sometimes also
perceived as incentives. We prefer to call these “job en-
ablers”, as essentially they constitute the basic resources
and enabling environment the health system should
make available for CHWs to perform well [12, 20, 24].
Some form of incentives is essential for CHW motiv-
ation and programme effectiveness and is expected by
CHWs and offered by most organisations [12, 13, 24–
27]. Some go a step further and argue that paying CHWs
is needed to recognise the importance of this role as part
of the health system, ensure fairness in terms of “pay-
ment for meaningful work” and substantial time invest-
ments and in order to provide much needed income in
Fig. 1 Model of the relationship between incentive types, motivation and CHW work behaviour (Daniels et al. 2014 [20])
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often impoverished settings [28, 29]. The CHW role is
often performed besides multiple (productive and repro-
ductive) responsibilities of women, and some men, in
rural areas [17, 30–33]. The new WHO guideline on
CHW programme support also recommends CHWs
should receive a financial package [11]. Yet others argue
that offering financial incentives is not always an effect-
ive or desirable strategy, as this may undermine the
volunteering spirit or make clients query CHWs’ motives
[27, 34–37].
This paper aims to take a critical look at the use of in-
centives and their link with improving CHW motivation,
and how the salaried vs. volunteer status of CHWs and
gaps in CHW expectations influence this link.
Methods
This study is a comparative analysis of qualitative studies
carried out in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Indonesia,
Malawi and Mozambique. These countries were part of
the REACHOUT research programme (2013-2018) fo-
cusing on factors influencing CHW performance [38].
The countries have well-established CHW programmes
but considerable variation in CHW typology.
In 2013, REACHOUT programme undertook an initial
international literature review [39] and developed a con-
ceptual framework modelling the factors influencing health
worker performance, with a special focus on CHWs [19,
25]. Using this unifying framework approach [40], the six
countries derived topic guides for semi-structured inter-
views (SSIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with pur-
posefully sampled CHWs, their supervisors, health
managers and selected community members. SSIs were
used to enable individual discussion (and took place in
homes and offices) and allowed for sensitive areas to be
probed, avoiding possible issues of power which can shape
group discussion. FGDs used group interaction to generate
findings to help understand community and organisational
norms, common health issues and the need for access and
use of healthcare services [41]. Sampling of study partici-
pants was based on their involvement in CHW pro-
grammes; variation was achieved based on demographic
characteristics of participants and geographical characteris-
tics of study sites. All six country studies explored par-
ticipants’ perspectives on factors influencing CHW
motivation, addressing incentives in terms of expectations
and actual (perceived) incentives. Altogether, 250 inter-
views and 65 FGDs were undertaken as part of the six
country qualitative context analyses, referred to as the
REACHOUT country studies [42–47]. Details of data
collection and respondents per country are presented in
Table 1; these as well as details regarding study design
(participant selection, setting, data collection), data analysis
and reporting can be found in detail in the referred six
REACHOUTcountry study reports.
For the current study, we performed a comparative ana-
lysis of the existing datasets of the six country studies, ana-
lysing them from various perspectives. We started off with
a cross-country review of the six country study reports. To
further deepen the themes that emerged from the ini-
tial analysis, we then performed secondary data ana-
lysis by reviewing existing datasets in Nvivo 10, for
codes related to incentives (various forms of incen-
tives and disincentives, motivation, job satisfaction,
training, career advancement). Main themes were
identified, narratives developed and contextual com-
parative analyses conducted to explore how the real-
ities of CHWs’ role within different countries shaped
their experiences and expectations (Table 2).
Results
Across all six study settings, incentives were found to be
an important factor influencing motivation of CHWs and
are shaped by three key emerging themes: the mode of
CHW engagement (employed vs. volunteering) influences
how various forms of incentives affect each other and mo-
tivation, incentive-related “expectation gaps” negatively in-
fluence motivation, incentives can cause friction for the
interface role of CHWs between communities and the
health sector.
The mode of CHW engagement influences how various
forms of incentives affect each other and motivation
Financial incentives were important in all study coun-
tries, whether they take the form of salaries or allow-
ances. The appreciation of the salaries CHWs received
in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Malawi as contracted staff
demonstrated this. CHWs in Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Kenya and Mozambique also welcomed the small
monthly volunteering allowance they received.
“Since I am paid my salary, I am committed to serve
the community. I am happy when I work hard and
take my salary.” (Salaried HEW, SSI-Ethiopia)
While salaries were seen as “part of the package” by
employed CHWs, voluntary CHWs did not always take
their allowance for granted. This was among others the
case in Indonesia, where CHWs (kader) said they did
not always receive an allowance as per policy.
Material incentives were seen as very important factors
affecting CHW motivation. While CHWs sometimes re-
ceived food or other goods from the communities they
served, receipt (or not) of this type of incentive was
linked to the organisation they worked with. This often
took the form of uniforms and backpacks, as well as job
enablers, such as bicycles and standard kits with supplies
and drugs.
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“So those [CHWs] with bicycles, you find they are
active. Those who do not have, you find that they are
challenged. So I would think if each had a bicycle, it
would become a lot better.” (Supervisor of voluntary
CHWs, SSI-Kenya)
Such material incentives and job enablers not only sup-
ported them in their work, but also served to reinforce the
standing of community health programmes, both for
CHWs and the communities they served.
Material incentives and job enablers were important to
employed as well as voluntary CHWs, albeit reasons for
this partially differed. For employed CHWs who are sure
of receiving a salary, material incentives seemed to be less
important; however, the absence of material incentives
constituted a disincentive, as we will elaborate below. At
the same time, many employed CHWs felt their salary is
(too) low, which may make material incentives more im-
portant. This also applied to voluntary CHWs, as allow-
ances were usually small. When the intervention design
failed to include material incentives, CHW motivation
was hindered and programme effectiveness undermined,
regardless of the presence of financial incentives.
“I have seen something that makes [CHWs] not to
work well. They don’t have transport. They don’t
have enough support to motivate them. Because the
work they do is voluntary.” (Supervisor of voluntary
CHWs, SSI-Kenya)
CHW respondents in all study countries (regardless of
whether they were employed or volunteers) mentioned
that they appreciated non-material incentives; many in-
dicated that these helped sustain motivation and made
them feel that communities value and appreciate them,
recognising the positive contribution of their work.
“A thing that pushes me to work hard is the
satisfaction of community by my services. (…) When
I see the output of my work, I am very happy.”
(Salaried HEW, FGD-Ethiopia)
Other examples of non-material incentives were feel-
ings of pride when the community “responds” to health
education work and being happy with knowledge and
skills obtained, encouragement from supervisors and
preferential treatment at the health facility.
Sometimes CHWs received less than expected commu-
nity appreciation; this was a de-motivator that seemed to
affect voluntary CHWs more than those salaried as it
hurts the core of the volunteering spirit:
“Those things that don’t do me good is that you can
get to a certain household and he or she doesn’t
want to respond. Imagine coming to help, am not
paid, have left my own work and then he or she
sees me as no one.” (Voluntary CHW, FGD-Kenya)
In Bangladesh, most CHWs (both employed and volun-
teers) reported that being appreciated, recognised and val-
ued by the communities they serve was more important
than the financial income they generated through provid-
ing these services.
Examples of intrinsic motivational factors were also
found in all study countries. Most CHWs desired to assist
fellow community members and felt they are useful to
their communities; these were major motivational factors,
both for salaried and voluntary CHWs. Other intrinsic fac-
tors mentioned included love for voluntary work and the
perception that as a CHW one is the key link between the
health facility and the community and it being “God’s will”.
Some CHWs insisted that monetary incentives were less
important than intrinsic motivation; this was more com-
mon among voluntary than salaried CHWs.
“The kader have to have the principle that this work
is voluntarily done, without asking for salary; if the
salary is available, just be grateful.” (Voluntary kader,
SSI-Indonesia)
In addition, several Kenyan respondents observed that
extrinsic incentives and job enablers can sustain intrinsic
volunteerism motivation and that lack of such incentives
can lead to demotivation.
“This service of a CHW is a calling (…). I have a
family, my family needs to eat, my children need to
study (…). I do not have a salary, many CHWs live
in sad places (…). It is my prayer that we get paid at
the end of the month and this will motivate us to
work.” (Voluntary CHW, FGD-Kenya)
On the other hand, others felt that the introduction of
financial incentives could weaken intrinsic motivation of
volunteers, as was observed in Indonesia:
“I think they were more active before they got incentives.
They worked voluntarily and not for money.” (Health
manager on voluntary kader, SSI-Indonesia)
Incentive-related “expectation gaps” negatively influence
motivation
In each country setting, employed and voluntary CHWs
expressed that when their expectations regarding incen-
tives were not met this negatively affected their motiv-
ation. Expectation gaps took various forms: lower than
expected financial incentives, later than expected pay-
ments, fewer than expected material incentives and job
Ormel et al. Human Resources for Health           (2019) 17:59 Page 6 of 12
enablers and unequally distributed incentives across
groups of CHWs.
First, employed CHWs often felt their salaries were
too low in comparison with their workload.
“Our salary is very unfair, with our responsibility and
the services we are giving for our society.” (Salaried
HEWs, FGD-Ethiopia)
Many respondents observed the same for voluntary
CHWs, who felt that their monetary compensation was
(far) below expectations. The importance of financial re-
wards and disappointment about the amount may also be
linked to the poor socio-economic backgrounds the
CHWs in our study sites hailed from and whether this
work was their primary source of income.
Second, whenever financial incentives of CHWs were
expected to be paid but where bureaucratic or other prob-
lems caused late disbursements, CHWs became demoti-
vated. Many CHWs reported receiving less than expected
or no financial incentives at all; some felt forced to use
their own resources to be able to do their job.
“This subsidy is just not enough for anything, but they
promised us and should at least give us the little at
the end of the month, and they give just nothing. (…)
I have to support my family.” (Voluntary APE –
Agente polivalente elementar (elementary
multipurpose agent), SSI-Mozambique)
Third, in most of the countries, CHWs observed gaps
between promised and received material incentives, such
as uniforms and (job enabling) standard kits. Many
CHWs also expected other material incentives.
“It requires an HSA to be given transport, identity card,
uniform and gumboots as our friends were given but
we have never been given.” (Salaried HSA, SSI-Malawi)
In all countries, CHWs observed important gaps be-
tween expected and actual job enablers, which acted as dis-
incentives for CHWs. CHWs found supportive supervision
irregular or not supportive and administration-oriented, in
a majority of the countries.
“[What does not please me is] being belittled by my
seniors, who see us as nothing and that we are doing
this work because we have nothing better to do.”
(Voluntary CHW, FGD-Kenya)
CHWs’ expectations regarding professional develop-
ment were often not met, as observed by respondents in
Ethiopia, Malawi and Mozambique. Lack of training op-
portunities was seen as contributing to the lack of career
opportunities in the same countries, to CHWs’ frustra-
tion. In most countries, CHWs’ expectations regarding
transport for home visits and sometimes also referrals
were not met.
“Everybody is developing in his career; we health
extension workers remain where we are. (…) These
things are pushing us backward not to work hard.”
(Salaried HEW, FGD-Ethiopia)
“We were promised motorbikes and bicycles and yet
they have not been fulfilled. False promises are really
frustrating.” (Voluntary CHW, FGD-Kenya)
Also, CHWs in Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malawi and
Mozambique noted the “inadequate” provision of equip-
ment and regular supplies to perform their duties, lead-
ing to frustration and demotivation.
Fourth, as there were no standardised incentive
structures for CHWs, incentive-related “competition”
between programmes employing CHWs affected motiv-
ation negatively.
“Those who are in government facilities get allowances
for outreach clinics, while here [at CHAM - Christian
Health Association of Malawi] we work for nothing if
we go for outreach clinics and in terms of transport.
In government facilities they are considered with a
motorcycle, but in CHAM not.” (Salaried HSA,
FGD-Malawi)
Such inequity disturbed the functioning of CHWs, by
subverting the incentive structures, thus challenging
underlying motivational processes. Another inequity sur-
faced when CHWs perceived the way material incentives
were distributed as unfair, due to favouritism and lack of
transparency, as found in Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi.
Ultimately, this undermined motivation and the func-
tioning of community health interventions.
“You will find that [the supervisor] will only invite the
few secretly [to receive some compensation] and not
all the CHWs. (…) This is something that makes us
demotivated and even think of withdrawing because
he is not transparent.” (Voluntary CHW, FGD-Kenya)
Incentives cause friction for the interface role of CHWs
between communities and the health sector
CHWs are playing a key facilitation and referral role
between communities and the health sector. Incentives
were sometimes observed to establish and strengthen re-
lationships and accountability, especially between CHWs
and their supervisors. This applied to both salaried and
voluntary CHWs.
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Conversely, lack of promised payments sometimes led
to mistrust towards those in the health sector, while de-
motivation sometimes led to reduced community trust
in CHWs, thus undermining the effectiveness of com-
munity health programmes.
“This job is very hard to do (…). This payment we are
supposed to get, the government is the one that is not
trustworthy. They should give some money for us to
be paid every month.” (Voluntary CHW, FGD-Kenya)
A Kenyan key informant observed that absence of a
government salary means a (volunteer) CHW cannot be
held accountable, in contrast with (salaried) community
health extension workers (CHEWs).
“Because CHEWs are paid by the government you can
hold them to account, rather than the volunteer
[CHW] who can leave an important job half way and
you cannot hold him/her accountable because they
were volunteering.” (Policy maker, SSI-Kenya)
The effect of payment on CHW accountability towards
communities remains to be seen; there was some evi-
dence that (perceptions about) payment of CHWs could
result in community mistrust.
“The community (…) will regard us as responsible and
meaningful people to the community. So even if they
say we get paid we just keep silent (…). What I don’t
like is them mocking me, you can get to some places
where they say we are paid and also they are speaking
in mockery tones.” (Voluntary CHW, FGD-Kenya)
Discussion
Our study findings from six different contexts contribute
to debates on how various types of incentives, alongside
job enablers, influence not only motivation but also each
other; and what the role is of CHW engagement (salar-
ied vs. voluntary) and the price of “false promises”.
Our findings demonstrate that both financial and non-
financial incentives, independently and together, improve
CHW motivation [12, 14, 32]. Monetary compensation is
highly valued and directly motivates CHWs to perform
better and allows them to dedicate themselves to their
jobs, whether in a salaried or volunteering position. Non-
financial incentives (material and non-material) can, with
or without accompanying financial incentives, also con-
tribute to motivation. However, financial incentives alone
seem insufficient to maintain motivation and need to be
complemented by other types of incentives and job en-
ablers like training and supplies, among others [11, 24, 25,
32, 48]. Both salaried and allowance-receiving voluntary
CHWs in all study contexts showed that intrinsic
motivational factors were also important to them, con-
firming findings elsewhere [24, 27, 49].
Discussion around a volunteering approach vs. provid-
ing salaries to CHWs is ongoing [13, 28, 34, 49]. Volun-
teers are, generally, unlikely to continue to serve without a
clear prospect of receiving salaries, especially as expecta-
tions in the form of tasks and workload expand [30–32].
Lack of salaries contributes to attrition within voluntary
CHW programmes and makes regular recruitment and
training of new volunteers necessary [13, 30, 48, 50].
The mode of engagement of CHWs affects the way in-
centives influence each other, as well as motivation.
Employed, salaried CHWs often seem demotivated due
to the perceived low level of monetary reward as com-
pared to workload and living costs [49]. Connectedness
to communities serving as intrinsic motivation is im-
portant to many salaried CHWs but cannot easily com-
pensate for the perceived low financial reward. The
reverse seems true for volunteers: the strong intrinsic
motivators identified by many voluntary CHWs prevent
them to become dispirited about their modest allow-
ances. Some explicitly indicate such financial incentives
are “nice” but not as important as the intrinsic factor
driving their volunteering spirit. In contrast, we also
found some evidence that extrinsic incentives and job
enablers can sustain intrinsic volunteerism motivation
and that lack of such incentives can lead to demotiv-
ation. At the same time, one statement of a manager in
Indonesia implied that the introduction of financial in-
centives for volunteers who previously did not receive
an allowance weakened intrinsic motivation. This poten-
tial negative effect of financial incentives has been
highlighted by other authors [24, 34, 48, 49, 51, 52].
While our findings indicate that the way incentives in-
fluence motivation depends at least in part on individual
behaviour, this is in turn influenced by context. Strachan
et al. [53] have argued that CHW motivation may in-
crease relevant to the degree CHWs identify with group
membership and share a collective social identity. Their
suggestion to use the Social Identity Approach theory to
help understand CHW motivation and design related in-
terventions is worthwhile to explore further.
Incentives do not automatically lead to improved mo-
tivation as expected. Authors over time have consistently
referred to enabling factors that should be present to en-
sure this [20, 24]. Indeed, our findings suggest that sev-
eral job enablers need to be in place but often were not,
including (i) minimum resources to perform well, such
as a functioning supply chain to enable implementation
of core tasks (e.g. for test kits and drugs) and some form
of transport where distances are unfeasibly long, for
CHWs to do their usual work and for CHW clients to
be referred; (ii) regular, supportive oriented (as opposed
to fault-finding or purely administrative-oriented)
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supervision; and (iii) continuous education and profes-
sional development opportunities. Other studies con-
firm this, also indicating that where any of these job
enablers is felt missing or much weaker than
anticipated, they are a barrier or disincentive to CHW
performance [13, 17, 33, 49, 54–56]. The WHO
guideline on support to CHW programmes makes ex-
plicit recommendations towards ensuring each of
these three enabling areas [11].
In line with the above, Fig. 2 presents our revised,
more detailed model to visualise the way incentives
interact with each other and with motivation, and the
way job enablers and CHW engagement influence incen-
tives and motivation.
The findings confirm that both salaried and voluntary
CHWs mostly feel that the monetary compensation they
receive is not commensurate with their efforts; this is
likely to be an important issue in poor socio-economic
contexts. Lower-than-expected incentives and not re-
ceiving promised (financial or material) incentives lead
to demotivation and are a barrier to performance [37,
57–59]. It is noteworthy that many CHWs appear to feel
more strongly about “broken promises” regarding incen-
tives and job enablers, than about the absolute level of
incentives received.
Incentive packages therefore should be in line with
CHW job demands, in terms of expectations regarding
type and number of tasks, training, as well as expected
time investment [11, 33, 58]. As important is that such
commitments then also are honoured.
Health systems are increasingly expected to be ac-
countable to the communities they serve. Authors have
argued that remuneration may lead to CHWs feeling
more accountable towards the health sector than to their
communities [60–62]. Reversely, if CHWs engaged by
the health system are not paid or otherwise formally em-
bedded, there is no valid mechanism for the system to
hold them accountable for their performance [17, 63].
Our findings show that (especially financial but also ma-
terial) incentives indeed may serve to establish and
strengthen relationships of accountability between CHWs
and their supervisors within the health system. If financial
incentives take the form of a salary tied to a position as
government staff, CHWs are well-integrated into the
health system and this can lead to increased effectiveness
[37]. Conversely, not receiving promised monetary incen-
tives (whether a salary or allowance) in time or not at all
creates mistrust towards the health system [14, 48].
Financial incentives may also put in jeopardy the ac-
countability relationship with the community. Mistrust
Fig. 2 Revised model: relationships between motivational factors, motivation and CHW work behaviour. CHW = community health worker
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between CHWs and the communities they serve is
sometimes created when community members perceive
allowances as “salary” and then interpret voluntary
CHWs as formally being part of the health sector and
make proportionate (demanding) claims on their sup-
port. Another study found that community members
may sometimes think CHWs withhold money or earn
money “behind their backs” [64].
The current paper is based on an analysis of existing
datasets from a broader study on factors influencing the
performance of CHWs in six country contexts. Although
different types of incentives were part of data provided
by study respondents, it is possible that more in-depth
information about incentives could have added to the
appreciation of factors influencing the way incentives
operate in the countries studied. While each country
study included the same categories of respondents, there
were differences in types and gender of respondents be-
tween countries (Table 1), which could have influenced
the findings. In addition, CHW programmes across the
world have many diverse features and contexts, which
pose limitations to the comparison and the generalisabil-
ity of study findings. To support generalisability, we have
tried to provide clear information about the programme
features and contexts of the CHW programmes studied
in the six countries, and also discussed where findings
are common or differing across the six REACHOUT
country contexts.
Conclusions
Whether CHWs are employed or engaged as volunteers
has implications for the way incentives influence motiv-
ation. While intrinsic motivational factors are important
to and experienced by both types of CHWs, for many sal-
aried CHWs, they may not suffice to compensate for the
demotivation that often exists and is arising from the per-
ceived low level of financial reward. In some contexts,
voluntary CHWs may not take allowances for granted and
continue to rely on intrinsic motivation to carry on with
their work. Yet overall, introducing and/or sustaining a
form of financial incentive seems key towards strengthen-
ing CHW motivation. Such remuneration should then be
fair (commensurate to the job demands) and consistent
(over time as well as across CHW groups with similar job
demands).
There is some evidence that extrinsic incentives and job
enablers can sustain intrinsic motivation for volunteerism.
Adequate expectation management regarding financial
and material incentives as well as job enablers is essential,
to prevent frustration about expectation gaps or “broken
promises” to negatively affect motivation. For many
CHWs, consistently receiving the type and amount of in-
centives promised appears as important to sustain motiv-
ation as raising the absolute level of incentives.
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